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In this article, I describe the major financial crises that evolved into economic 
crises during the past four hundred years in Europe, the United States, and Asia, 
before turning to the 2007-10 global financial and economic crisis. My focus will be 
Tulipmania of 1637, Mississippi Scheme of 1720, South Sea Bubble of 1720, Great 
Crash of 1929, Crash of 1987, Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, Dot-com Bubble of 
2000, and Financial Crisis of 2007-10. I identify commonalities as well as 
distinguishing characteristics among the events. In the discussion and description 
that follows, I note that the tendency is for more common features than 
distinguishing ones to exist. To put all of this in perspective, let’s start with a quote: 
The arrogance of officialdom should be tempered and controlled, and 
assistance to foreign hands should be curtailed, lest [we] fall.1 
As current as the topic and the description, it is amazing to understand in the 
actual quote that the bracketed “we” would be replaced by “Rome” since it was 
written by Marcus Tullius Cicero in 55 B.C. The sentence itself underscores the 
tendency for economic financial crises to repeat, and in doing so, to repeat in similar 
patterns. 
I.  TULIPMANIA 1637 
Tulipmania is one of the best known examples of financial bubbles and has 
become a euphemism for booms and busts. As such, it is a good opening act for the 
first three bubbles, all of which occurred in Europe. This financial bubble occurred 
in Holland. 
A.  Boom 
The origin of Tulipmania has been traced to Conrad Gesner, who in 1559 saw a 
tulip in an Augsburg garden belonging to Counselor Herwart, known for his 
collections. Counselor Herwart had received the tulip from a friend in 
Constantinople “where the flower had long been a favorite.”2 Tulips quickly became 
popular among the upper classes in Holland. Wealthy residents of Amsterdam, for 
instance, were willing to purchase bulbs from Constantinople, and pay extravagant 
prices for them. Eventually, the tulip increased in reputation to such an extent that it 
was considered bad taste for prominent families not to have a collection. By 1634, 
the rage among the Dutch to own tulips was so great that business and industry in the 
country became neglected, with most of the population involved in the tulip trade. 
As the bubble increased, prices rose until by 1635 many owners had invested a 
fortune in tulips. It was not uncommon for individuals to have committed more than 
                                                          
 1 Cicero’s Budget Plan of 55 B.C., TRUTHORFICTION.COM, http://www.erumors.net/ 
rumors/c/cicero-plan.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2010). 
 2 CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF 
CROWDS 92 (Harmony Books, 1980). 
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100,000 florins in tulip roots. At the exorbitant price for tulips, this amount would 
buy less than 50 roots.  
Tulips were sold by their weight in perites, a weight less than a grain. For 
instance, a tulip of the species called Admiral Lifken weighing 400 perites was 
worth 4,400 florins.3 By 1636, the demand for tulips of a rare species had increased 
so much that regular markets for their sale were established on exchanges in 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Haarlem, Leyden, Alkmaar, Hoorn, and other towns. A 
market dealing largely in tulips also became active. 
Dutch investors assumed that the passion for tulips would last forever and that 
wealthy individuals from other parts of the world would turn to Holland for tulips. 
As a result, people of all income levels and from many European countries converted 
their property into cash, which they invested in tulip flowers. The tulip trade became 
so active that a code of laws for guidance of tulip dealers was adopted. 
B.  Bust 
By late 1636, however, some prudent investors began to fear that the demand 
would not last forever. Some owners began to sell their tulips, rather than keep them 
in their gardens to admire. In its early stages, this sell off meant prices were no 
longer booming, and profit margins began to decline. As profits diminished, 
investors were less willing to speculate, which decreased demand. This soon led to 
prices beginning to fall, and with the decline confidence fell. Quickly, universal 
panic seized owners and purchasers. Over time, many merchants were reduced 
almost to begging, and the fortunes of many noble families were destroyed. 
Seeking a solution to the problem, representatives from all over Holland 
consulted with the government. The government refused to intervene and advised 
tulip holders to agree on a plan among themselves. Representatives eventually 
agreed that all contracts made at the height of the mania, or prior to November 1636, 
should be declared null and void.  
For contracts made after that date, purchasers would be excused from their 
obligations on paying ten percent of the purchase price to sellers. As we will see in a 
subsequent section, this solution was adopted by England following the collapse of 
the South Sea Bubble. By the end of the bubble, tulips which had been selling for 
6,000 florins could be purchased for 500 florins.4 This meant the bailout plan was 
inadequate for purchasers who bought at the peak. For instance, purchasers who 
bought at 6,000 florins would be discharged by paying 600 florins, but this was still 
100 florins more than the market value.  
Actions for breach of contract were brought in all Dutch courts, but the courts 
refused to take cognizance of them, considering them unenforceable gambling debts. 
The government did not take any further steps to resolve the crisis. As a result, those 
who were unlucky enough to have tulips on hand at the time of the collapse were 
ruined. Those who had made profits, however, were allowed to keep them. 
C.  Aftermath 
The Dutch economy suffered a severe shock that may have resulted in the 
transition of the industrial revolution from the Dutch to the English economies. 
                                                          
 3 Id. at 94.  
 4 Id. at 99.  
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D.  Summary 
A summary of Tulipmania 1637, as well as the other crises discussed, appears in 
Chart 4 near the end of this article. Among the factors considered, the stronger ones 
are highlighted in gray and the lesser ones in black. Tulipmania involved a bubble, 
with human emotion and greed prevalent in both the speculative upswing and the 
downturn. Foreign direct investment was not a factor, other than some non-Dutch 
investors becoming involved, but this was not a driving force in the boom. Similarly, 
exchange rates were not relevant since the crisis only involved florins, the Dutch 
currency. Poor economic fundamentals existed as business people abandoned 
industry for the tulip trade, but it was not a driving force behind the crisis. Investors 
were uneducated, since tulips, stocks, and the market were new products being 
offered. Program trading and technology development, which did not arise until the 
19th and 20th centuries, respectively, were not relevant. Similarly, mergers and 
acquisitions were not involved, since investors were buying tulips, not companies. 
Sadly, the effect was limited to Holland, which lost its leadership in the upcoming 
industrial revolution, and did not spill over to its principal competitors, France and 
England. 
II.  MISSISSIPPI SCHEME 1720 
The Mississippi Scheme was a French crisis involving a Scot and the Americas. 
It had its origins when John Law, a transplant from London to Edinburgh, 
established Banque Generale in Paris and sold stock in the Mississippi Company, 
which was given development rights in North America. John’s father was the 
younger son of an ancient family, who became a leading goldsmith and banker in 
Edinburgh. As such, he amassed considerable wealth that allowed him to purchase 
estates in several parts of Scotland.5  
John was the oldest son and started working in his father’s counting house at the 
age of 14 where he labored for three years learning the banking business. He was 
extremely good with numbers. Upon the death of his father in 1688, he turned from 
the business world to society life. As a young, vain, and good-looking wealthy 
member of society, he moved to London, where he spent his money lavishly. 
Because of his skill with math, he was very good at gambling. Unfortunately, his 
luck did not last and he ultimately lost most of his fortune.6  
Soon thereafter, an affair resulted in a challenge, the death of his challenger, and 
his arrest. After escaping, he fled to the continent, where he traveled for three years, 
devoting himself to monetary and banking affairs. In 1700, he returned to Edinburgh 
where he published a book, Proposals and Reasons for Constituting a Council of 
Trade.7  
He also called for the establishment of what he called a land bank. Notes to be 
issued by the bank, under his plan, would never exceed the value of land owned by 
the state, would pay ordinary interest and, if unpaid, would entitle the holder to enter 
into possession of land securing the notes. The project received a lot of attention 
from the Scottish Parliament with a motion for the establishment of such a bank 
being presented by a neutral party. Parliament, however, ultimately passed a 
                                                          
 5 Id. at 2. 
 6 Id. at 2-3. 
 7 Id. at 4. 
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resolution stating that the establishment of any kind of paper credit was an improper 
approach for the nation.8  
Following this failure, Law returned to the continent and gambling. For 14 years, 
he traveled through Flanders, Holland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and France where 
he became acquainted with the trade and resources of each. In the gambling salons of 
Paris, he met the Duke d’Orleans. When a proposed finance scheme incorporating 
his land bank, which he presented to the French, was rejected, he moved to Italy 
where he unsuccessfully proposed a land bank for that country.9 
On the death of Louis XIV in 1715, since the heir was only seven years of age, 
the Duke d’Orleans assumed control of government as regent. The regent found 
France’s finances in considerable disarray. The deceased king had been corrupt and 
extravagant, and his expenditures had brought France almost to the verge of ruin. 
The national debt was 300 million livres; but revenue was 145 million livres with 
expenses of 142 million livres. This only left 3 million livres to service the debt. 
While some leaders, including the Duke du St. Simon encouraged the regent to 
consider national bankruptcy, this measure was rejected.10  
Instead, a recoinage was ordered under which the currency was depreciated by 
one-fifth. The plan required citizens to turn in their gold and silver coins, for which 
they received a reduced amount of coins.11 If, for instance, they brought in 1,000 
pieces, they only received 800 in return. By this measure, the Treasury earned 72 
million livres, but created great disorder in the markets.  
The next step in trying to solve this problem was a call for the Chamber of 
Justice to investigate tax collectors. The resulting investigation was followed by the 
conviction of corrupt tax collectors and confiscation of their assets. Unfortunately, 
government corruption did not end with the tax collectors, since most of the money 
collected during the confiscation was misspent and not used to reduce the debt. It is 
estimated that out of about 180 million livres collected, only 80 million livres was 
used to pay down the debt.12 
A.  Boom 
At this time, Law returned to renew his acquaintance with the Duke d’Orleans. 
His solution for the crisis was to set up a bank that would manage the royal 
revenues, and issue notes on the revenues with state-owned land serving as security. 
He also proposed that the bank be administered in the king’s name, but subject to 
control of commissioners to be named by the Estates Generale, the French 
parliament. To support his arguments, he had his book translated into French.13  
On May 5, 1716, a royal edict was published pursuant to which Law was 
authorized to establish a bank under the name of Law and Company, the notes of 
which could be used to pay taxes. Its capital was 6 million livres, based on 12,000 
                                                          
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 6. 
 10 Id. at 7. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 9.  
 13 Id. at 10. 
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shares of 500 livres each. The shares could be purchased by putting 25% down – 
one-fourth had to be in cash, with the remainder in the form of a note.14 
Law made all his notes payable at sight in the coin current at the time they were 
issued. This meant his notes retained their value and would not depreciate, which 
made them more valuable than government notes. The latter were constantly being 
depreciated by the government’s spending habits, since they could be paid off with 
future depreciated currency. After declaring that bankers deserved death for issuing 
paper without sufficient security against all demands, his notes traded at one percent 
more than government notes.  
Quickly, the French economy began to improve. Commerce began to rise, taxes 
were paid, and confidence returned to the market. Within a year, Law’s notes traded 
at a 15% premium, while notes issued by the government as security for debts 
contracted by the extravagant Louis XIV traded at a 78% discount. Branches of his 
bank were established at Leone, Rochelle, Tours, Amiens and Orleans.15  
Soon, thereafter, Law proposed that his company receive the exclusive privilege 
of trading in the province of Louisiana, which France had created along the 
Mississippi River. Purportedly, the area was rich in precious metals. Under the 
proposal, his company would be the sole collector of taxes and coiners of money in 
the province. In August 1717, letters patent were issued incorporating a new 
company, the Mississippi Company, with exclusive rights in this province. The 
company’s capital was divided into 200,000 shares, with stated capital value of 500 
livres each. The purchase price had to be paid in government currency at its normal 
value. The market value per share at the time of issue was 160 livres.16 
A frenzy of speculation soon seized the nation. Law’s bank had done so much 
good and was perceived as having such potential that any future promises he made 
were believed. Another factor driving this enthusiasm was the regent, who continued 
to grant new privileges. Law’s bank, for instance, obtained a monopoly on the sale of 
tobacco, received the sole right to refine gold and silver, and was renamed the 
Banque Generale.17 
Once the bank shifted from a private to a public institution, the regent took over 
control and management and began to issue notes, estimated at 1 billion livres in 
value. This was in contrast to its earlier financings. During the time it was under 
Law’s control, its issues did not exceed 60 million livres.  
Unfortunately, Law had to contend with a jealous Estates Generale that was 
resentful of his success and influence, particularly as a foreigner. This antagonism 
hardened when the regent dismissed the chancellor, Henri François d'Aguesseau, for 
opposition to the vast increase of paper money and the resulting depreciation of gold 
and silver. His replacement, Marc René de Voyer de Paulmy, Marquis D’Argenson, 
was willing to follow the regent’s financial leadership, and continued to increase 
coinage. For instance, persons bringing into the mint 4,000 livres in specie (paper 
money backed by gold and silver) and 1,000 livres in paper received 5,000 livres in 
new currency. Although the Estates Generale tried to prevent the continuation of the 
                                                          
 14 Id. at 11. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 12. 
 17 Id. 
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policy by issuing a decree to that effect, the regent annulled the decree, although he 
had to do it several times.18  
Becoming more antagonistic, the Estates General passed a decree dated August 
12, 1718 stating that Banque Generale was prohibited from having any involvement 
with administration of government revenue. The decree also prohibited foreigners 
from being involved in management and finances of the state. Following the decree, 
Law fled to the Royal Palace where he sought protection from the regent, who 
promptly arrested the president and two of the Estates Generale’s counselors. This 
move dissipated parliament’s objection for the time. With this threat solved for the 
moment, Law returned home and the value of the bank’s shares began to rise again.19 
In 1719, an edict granted Mississippi Company the exclusive privilege of trading 
in the East Indies, China, and the South Seas, as well as all the possessions of the 
French East India Company, which had been established by Jean-Baptiste Colbert, 
minister of finance under Louis XIV. To finance this expanded role, the company 
issued 50,000 new shares at 500 livres each. Law promised a yearly dividend of 200 
livres on each share.20 Enthusiasm for his company, which had been rising for a long 
time, accelerated. Three hundred thousand applications were made for the 50,000 
new shares, and Law’s house was deluged with eager applicants. As a result, Law 
had to move to a larger house, but the crowds continued to follow him. Demand for 
the shares was so great that shares sometimes rose 10% to 20% within a few hours.21 
B.  Bust 
The bubble flourished until the beginning of 1720. Up to this time, warnings by 
the Estates Generale that the creation of too much paper would sooner or later lead 
the country into bankruptcy had been disregarded. The regent, who did not 
understand finance, continued to support Law who issued certificates to keep pace 
with the rising value of Mississippi Company stock. 
The first alarm occurred in 1720 when the Prince de Conti, who was offended by 
Law’s refusal to issue him new shares following the grant of the East Indies, China, 
and South Seas rights, had his bank sell all his existing Mississippi Company shares, 
demanding repayment in specie of such an enormous quantity of notes that three 
wagons were required for its transport.22 Other investors soon followed suit, and 
Mississippi Company stock ceased its rise.  
Some of the investors who sold their Mississippi Company stock sent gold and 
silver that they received to England or Holland in anticipation of a collapse. Others 
began to horde their gold and silver. The cumulative effect was that little specie was 
left in circulation.23 With money in short supply, trade became very difficult since 
there was no money to pay for goods and services. 
In February 1720, an edict was issued, which instead of restoring credit in 
France, destroyed it. Under the edict, citizens were forbidden from possessing more 
                                                          
 18 Id. at 13. 
 19 Id. at 14. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 19. 
 22 Id. at 28. 
 23 See id. at 30. 
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than 500 livres of coin. They were also forbidden from buying jewelry and precious 
metals. As a result, buyers could not pay more than 500 livres in coins when making 
purchases. Since no one would take paper, the means of payment in France 
disappeared in 1720. With the economy in decline, Mississippi Company shares 
followed suit and declined in value.24  
Later that month, a new edict required all payments to be made in paper. To fund 
such payments, the government printed 1.5 billion livres in notes.25 The increase in 
supply, and lack of exchangeability into metal, drove down the economy even 
further, as well as the value of notes.  
The regent called a meeting of his council at the beginning of May, at which Law 
and all ministers were present. During the meeting, it was estimated that the total 
amount of notes in circulation was 2.6 billion livres. Coins in circulation equaled 
less than half that amount. Law opposed depreciating the outstanding notes; 
however, on May 21 an edict was issued by which shares and notes of his bank 
would gradually diminish in value until, by the end of the year, they would only be 
worth half their nominal worth. Parliament refused to register the edict, and 
demanded that the regent and his council publish an edict restoring the notes to their 
original value.26 
Events quickly accelerated and values began to collapse quickly. On May 27, the 
Banque Generale stopped payment in specie. Law and d’Argenson were dismissed 
from the ministry, with the regent putting the blame on Law for the emerging crisis. 
On June 1, an order was published abolishing the law that made it criminal to hold 
coin in excess of 500 livres. Everyone was permitted to have as much specie as they 
pleased. To make certain that sufficient bank notes would be available, 25 million 
livres in new notes paying 2.5% interest were created on the security of the revenues 
of the city of Paris. These new notes were not popular with holders of Mississippi 
Company stock who still hoped that their stock would rebound.27  
To encourage purchase of the new notes, on August 15, an edict was passed 
restricting the use of old Banque Generale notes between 1,000 and 10,000 livres to 
the purchase of annuities and opening bank accounts. Any other usage was 
prohibited. In October, another edict was passed which deprived the old notes of any 
value after November. In addition, the advantages and privileges of the Mississippi 
Company were removed, and the company was privatized.28  
This was the death blow for the Mississippi Company. Shares, which had 
originally issued at 500 and risen to 18,000 livres, became worthless by 1720. 
C.  Aftermath 
It can be argued that the dissatisfaction of French citizens in 1720 made them 
less tolerant of government and its mistakes, and made them more susceptible to 
revolt, leading to the French Revolution of 1789-99. Another aftermath of the 
Mississippi Scheme may be the greater involvement of government in the French 
                                                          
 24 See id. at 30-31. 
 25 Id. at 32. 
 26 Id. at 33. 
 27 See generally id. at 34-35.  
 28 Id. at 40. 
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economy today, since government could not rely on business to manage what was 
best for society. 
D.  Summary 
A summary of the Mississippi Scheme of 1720 appears below in Chart 4. The 
scheme obviously involved a bubble driven by human emotion and greed in both the 
speculative upswing and the downturn. Foreign direct investment became relevant 
with the establishment of the Mississippi Company, although the underlying cause 
did not start with Mississippi, but the bank. There was also an outflow of money to 
other European markets to avoid the collapse, but again it was not an underlying 
cause. Poor economic fundamentals existed, as well, but did not cause or create the 
crisis. Investors were uneducated, since stocks and the stock market were new 
products being offered. Obviously, the result was an economic crash following the 
panic selling in the stock market crash. The effect, however, was limited to France, 
and did not spill over to other countries. 
III.  SOUTH SEA BUBBLE 1720 
The South Sea Bubble was an English crisis that involved Asia and Latin 
America, both of which were considered the “next big thing.” 
A.  Boom 
The South Sea Company was created by Harley Earl of Oxford in 1711, and 
given a monopoly on trade with the South Seas.29 Enthusiasm for the new company 
was based on the belief that it would be able to do business, not only with the South 
Seas, but also with South America where gold and silver mines of Peru and Mexico 
were located. Soon afterwards, however, Philip V of Spain announced that he had no 
intention of allowing the English to enter and trade in Spanish American ports. 
After negotiations with the Spanish, however, a contract was signed that gave 
South Sea Company the privilege of supplying the Spanish colonies with slaves for 
30 years and sending vessels once a year to Mexico, Peru and, Chile. The vessel 
tonnage and value, however, were limited, and South Sea Company was required to 
give the King of Spain one-fourth of the profits and pay a tax of five percent on the 
remainder.30 Nevertheless, confidence in the new company was not shaken.  
Soon after a speech by King George I to the opening session of Parliament in 
1717, the South Sea Company and the Bank of England made competing proposals 
to finance the nation’s existing debt. Their proposals were intended to restore public 
credit that had collapsed during Robert Walpole’s preceding Whig Administration, 
and to ensure payment of Army and Navy debentures, as well as other parts of 
England’s floating debt. At the time, the total debt was over 10 million pounds.31  
The South Sea Company requested an increase of its capital stock from 10 to 12 
million pounds in exchange for assuming the nation’s debt, with the government 
paying six percent interest on the debt. The interest of 600,000 pounds per annum 
would be secured by government duties on wine, vinegar, India goods, silks, 
tobacco, whale fins and other articles. The Bank made similar requests. After 
                                                          
 29 Id. at 49. 
 30 Id. at 47. 
 31 Id. at 46. 
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considerable debate in the House of Commons, three acts were proposed called the 
South Sea Act, the Bank Act, and the General Fund Act. Under the South Sea Act, 
the government would pay down the debt by 2 million pounds and accept South Sea 
Company’s proposal to finance the balance. Under the second act, some of the 
Bank’s debt would be cancelled and the interest rate on some of the remaining Bank 
debt would be reduced. The General Fund Act recited the various financial problems 
that were affecting the nation.32  
On January 22, 1720, the House of Commons resolved itself into a committee of 
the whole to consider a revised proposal from South Sea Company, which specified 
that debts of the state, recalculated as 30,981,712 pounds, would be assumed by the 
company with the government paying five percent interest on the debt through 1727. 
After that date, all or any part of the debt could be redeemed by Parliament at its 
option, with interest reduced to four percent on any remaining balance. The Bank of 
England objected, wanting to participate in the financing scheme. To gather support 
for its proposal, the South Sea Company made concessions, offering to allow the 
government to redeem its debts after four years instead of seven. The Bank also 
improved its offer.33  
On February 2, the South Sea Company’s proposal was accepted. During the 
period that the House of Commons had debated the bill, the South Sea Company 
directors, especially its chairman, Sir John Blunt, worked to boost the company’s 
stock price. Rumors were circulated, for instance, that a treaty between England and 
Spain would soon be signed granting free trade for England to all Spanish colonies. 
Through such methods, the stock price rose to 400 pounds, but eventually settled 
about 330 pounds.34 
In the House of Lords, the bill was passed on April 7. When the bill was given 
royal assent, however, South Sea Company stock fell to around 290 pounds. To 
counter the price decline, rumors were again circulated by company officials. One 
rumor was that England had received overtures from the Spanish government to 
exchange Gibraltar and Port Mahon for places on the coast of Peru and that the 
Company’s authorized trade in the South Sea would be expanded. In addition, 
rumors circulated that instead of one annual ship, Spain would increase the number 
and not charge any percentage of the profits.35  
In response, the stock rose again. In a few days, the stock price advanced to 340. 
To raise the price even higher, it was announced on April 21 that a mid-summer 
dividend of 10 percent would be issued. On May 29, South Sea Company stock rose 
as high as 500 pounds with approximately two-thirds of government annuitants 
exchanging state securities for South Sea Company securities. By the first of June, 
its stock price had risen to 890 pounds.36 
                                                          
 32 Id. at 48. 
 33 Id. at 49-50. 
 34 Id. at 51. 
 35 Id. at 53. 
 36 Id.  
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B.  Bust 
Although many people felt that the stock could rise even higher, some investors 
increasingly began to sell. Eventually, the number of sellers exceeded the number of 
buyers, and, with more sellers than buyers, the stock price began to fall. By June 3, 
the stock had fallen from 890 pounds to 640 pounds. Company directors were 
alarmed by this drop and gave their agents orders to buy. These efforts succeeded 
and by the evening, confidence in the company had returned. The shares continued 
to hold at this level through June 22.37  
During the month of August, however, the stock price began to fall and by 
September 2 was quoted at 700 pounds. At this point, investors’ mood shifted from 
worry to panic. To abate the problem, the directors summoned a general 
shareholders meeting for September 8. Several resolutions were passed at that 
meeting, but they had no effect on public opinion or company share price. That 
evening, its stock price fell to 640 pounds and by the next day had fallen to 540 
pounds. The price continued to fall until it was as low as 400 pounds. On September 
12, several conferences were held between directors of the company and directors of 
the Bank of England. A report was soon circulated that the Bank had agreed to 
redeem 6 million pounds of South Sea Company’s bonds. This caused the 
company’s stock to rise to 670 pounds. In the afternoon, when the report was found 
to be groundless, the stock fell to 580 pounds, the next day to 570 pounds, and then 
gradually to 400 pounds. At this point, the Bank of England attempted to restore 
confidence by finally offering to redeem bonds issued by South Sea Company.38 
By the afternoon of September 20, there was little interest among investors in 
purchasing South Sea Company stock or bonds. The company became so discredited 
that a run commenced on goldsmiths and bankers who had lent money on South Sea 
Company stock. Many of these businesses soon shut their doors. One company that 
had been a chief cashier of South Sea Company bonds stopped payment on the 
bonds. This occasioned a run on the Bank of England, which, as noted above, had 
agreed to redeem bonds issued by South Sea Company. South Sea Company stock 
continued to fall – to 150 pounds and gradually after fluctuations to 135 pounds.39 
Once the Bank realized its offer to redeem South Sea Company bonds was not 
restoring public confidence, it announced that it would no longer support the bonds. 
The state of affairs was so alarming at this point that King George I returned from 
Hanover to England, arriving on November 11. Parliament was summoned to meet 
on December 8. In its session, Parliament passed a bill keeping in effect all South 
Sea Company subscriptions and contracts. Another bill restricted South Sea 
directors, governors, sub-governors and other employees from leaving England.40 
During this time, many directors were taken into custody, particularly Sir John 
Blunt, who was considered the original author and creator of the scheme. On 
February 16, 1721 Parliament’s committee of secrecy made its report to the House of 
Commons. The report stated that the books of the company were false and fictitious 
with many entries showing blanks for the names of stockholders. It also noted that 
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there were frequent erasures and alterations and that in some of the books pages had 
been torn out. It also found that some books of particular importance had been 
destroyed. In addition, the committee found bribes had been paid to government 
officials.41 
After taking steps to punish the directors, the company’s remaining assets, 
including cash held by South Sea Company, were distributed to its owners. This was 
not sufficient to cover their losses, however, since the company’s capital account 
was 37.8 million pounds, of which 24.5 million pounds was raised and 13.3 million 
pounds was profit earned by the company. The cash available for distribution was 
only 8 million pounds, or about 33 pounds per share.42 This was a small percentage 
of what the company’s stock price had been, and what purchasers had paid. The 
difference was value lost by investors.  
Parliament sought to minimize investors’ losses, and, in doing so, restore public 
credit. It adopted a solution similar to that used by the Dutch during the Tulipmania 
collapse – any person who borrowed money secured by South Sea Company stock 
would be discharged on payment by the debtor of ten percent of the sum borrowed.43  
C.  Aftermath 
With this, England gradually began to work its way out of the crisis and to move 
forward, although it was a long time before public credit was restored. Unlike the 
French economy, however, the government did not become more involved with 
managing the economy. Entrepreneurship remained an individual pursuit. 
D.  Summary 
A summary of the South Sea Bubble of 1720 appears below in Chart 4. As with 
the Mississippi Scheme, the South Sea Bubble involved a bubble, with lots of human 
emotion and greed in both the rise and fall of the stock price. Foreign direct 
investment was not relevant since the emphasis on the South Seas and South 
America concerned trade, not investment. Poor economic fundamentals existed, as 
well, but they were not an underlying cause of the crisis. Investors were uneducated, 
since stocks and the stock market were new products being offered, just as they had 
been in the Mississippi Scheme. Obviously, the result was an economic crash 
following the panic selling in the stock market crash. The effect, however, was 
limited to England, and did not spill over to other countries. 
IV.  GREAT CRASH 1929 
The Great Crash, which began in 1929, was the start of the Great Depression, 
which lasted in the United States from 1929-1939. It is the standard by which 
economic and financial crises, including the most recent 2007-10 crisis, are 
measured. There is a reason for its status as the reference point for such crises. 
Industrial production did not return to pre-1929 levels until the late 1930s. Similarly, 
gross domestic product (GDP) did not return to 1929 levels until the late 1930s. 
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While unemployment during the 2007-10 crisis exceeded ten percent, during the 
Great Depression it exceeded twenty percent.44 
A.  Boom 
The lead-up to the Great Crash follows the patterns previously observed in 
Holland, France, and England. The boom started in November 1927 when the United 
States came out of a recession that began in October 1926. The recovery was 
facilitated by the New York Federal Reserve Bank lowering its discount rate by half 
a point and purchasing $230 million of government securities.45 The rate reduction 
made loans less expensive, thereby encouraging businesses and consumers to borrow 
and use the money for purchases. The government securities purchase injected 
money into the economy. Both approaches are common economic recovery 
methods.46  
The Achilles heel of the economic boom, however, was already in place. On 
April 28, 1925, Britain announced its return to the gold standard for the pound, 
setting the value of the pound at its pre-World War I value of $4.86. This increased 
the value of the pound, making exports more expensive.47 Three years later, in June 
1928, France also returned to the gold standard, setting the franc at 25.51 per dollar. 
As the economy began to rebound prior to 1927, the stock market followed, and 
soon became a bull market (upswing in stock market prices). In turn, this attracted 
even more investors.48 In 1928, the stock market boom accelerated. 
Supporting the stock market surge was an explosion of technological 
developments, which made life and society easier. Consumers could now fly, drive, 
talk on a telephone, and use electricity to operate appliances. Items that never existed 
or would have seemed impossible in the past, now were possible and expected.  
A decline in real estate markets also encouraged the rising stock market. Many 
stock market investors had cashed out their investments in real estate when those 
returns declined. Interest in Florida and Florida land, for instance, which began to 
flourish in the 1920s, had waned by the late 1920s.49 
The emergence of mega-corporations at this time also encouraged the bull 
market. Some of the major corporations created were U.S. Steel (1901),50 General 
Motors (1908),51 and General Foods (1895, but renamed in 1929 after mergers).52 
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Corporate founders used readily available funds in the stock market to fund these 
acquisitions and mergers,53 which in turn increased corporate assets54 and stock 
prices. 
Another development behind the rising market was the increasing purchase of 
stocks on the margin.55 Buyers without sufficient cash to pay the full market price of 
stocks could buy on the margin, which allowed buyers to pay some of the purchase 
price in cash with the rest borrowed from brokers. In the 1920s, buyers only had to 
put down 10% of the purchase price.56 This created major risks, since if the price 
fell, the broker would have to issue a margin call, which meant that the buyer had to 
pay the entire balance owed. In an attempt to slow up the increasing use of margins, 
the Federal Reserve announced in February 1929 a ban on bank loans for securities 
margin trades, but this had little impact on the bull market.57 
These changes and the rising stock market affected the American psyche in three 
ways. First, the market began to be seen as a low-risk investment vehicle. Economist 
Irving Fisher, for instance, stated, “Stock prices have reached what looks like a 
permanently high plateau.”58 Second, the boom shifted investors’ time perception of 
the market. It was no longer seen as a long-term investment, but as a means for 
short-term gains and a way to become rich.59 Third, interest in the stock market 
became a part of the American psyche, with stocks a favorite issue for discussion, 
not just among wealthy classes, but also among the middle class and anyone with 
available cash. This was fed by newspaper stories of ordinary people making 
millions off the stock market. An article in Ladies’ Home Journal in 1929, for 
instance, was entitled “Everyone Ought to be Rich.”60 
By early 1929, investors had one goal – get into the stock market. Many 
companies reinvested profits in the stock market instead of expanding production or 
sales, since stock market returns were higher than sales returns.61 Banks even used 
funds to purchase securities rather than making them available for loans. Both 
developments reduced money available for and spent on economic growth. 
A precursor of the Great Crash occurred on March 25, 1929 when the stock 
market suffered a mini-crash. The timing was unfortunate for Herbert Hoover, who 
was sworn in as U.S. president earlier that month on March 4. When prices fell, 
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margin calls were made, and panic set in. The mini-crash was averted when a 
leading banker, Charles Mitchell, president of National City Bank (now Citibank), 
announced that his bank was still lending money to buy stocks. His reassurance 
worked in March, although we will see that it did not work later that year in 
October.62  
Later, in the spring of 1929, signs that the economy was slowing began to 
emerge. Steel production dropped, house construction slowed, and car sales fell. 
Nevertheless, the public perception remained that the economy and stock market 
would continue to grow. As it did so, those advising caution were dismissed as 
pessimists to be ignored.63 
During the summer of 1929, the stock market boomed. From June through 
August, stock market prices set new record highs. By August, the economy peaked, 
although no one recognized it at the time.64 
The stock market reached its peak on September 3 when the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA) closed at 381.17 and the New York Times index of 
industrial stocks reached 452.65 
B.  Bust 
Two days later, on September 5, the market started dropping. The decline, 
however, was not noticeable since significant fluctuations hid the trend. 
On October 24, more commonly known as Black Thursday, investors panicked 
and sold 12,894,650 shares.66 This was double the previous record for stock sales. 
The resulting margin calls increased sales as investors sold stock to cover their 
margin calls. There was some reprieve in the afternoon when a group of bankers, 
including Charles Mitchell of National City Bank, pooled their own money and 
invested in the stock market.67 This gesture reassured many investors, who started to 
buy back into the market at what was considered bargain prices. The market 
continued to rally the next day. 
The following week, however, was the death knell of the stock market as the 
decline continued and then accelerated. Investors, who had been scared by almost 
losing their savings on Black Thursday and had thought about it over the weekend, 
began to sell shares on Monday, October 28.68 The Dow’s decline of 13% that day 
was a record. Losses for the day were $16 billion.69 
On October 29, also known as Black Tuesday, 16,410,030 shares were sold,70 a 
volume record that was not broken for nearly 40 years in 1968. Sales volume was so 
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great that the stock ticker fell two and half hours behind the market. The New York 
Times index of industrial stocks dropped nearly 40 points or another 12% that day.71 
Even though William C. Durant, members of the Rockefeller family, and other 
financial giants bought large quantities of stock, the market slid downward, losing 
another $14 billion, bringing its two-day losses to $30 billion.72 
In hopes that investors would come to their senses given time, the stock market 
was closed on Friday, November 1, for a few days. The hope was ill founded. When 
it reopened on Monday, November 4, the decline continued. On November 13, stock 
market prices reached their low for the year, with the New York Times index of 
industrial stocks at 224, down from 452.73 By November 23, stock prices seemed to 
stabilize, but only temporarily. The market continued to fall for another three years 
until July 8, 1932, when it reached its lowest level in the 20th century with the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average closing at 41.22.74  
As fascinating as is the story of the Great Crash, the false steps of the United 
States in addressing it, many of which forced the economy into a depression, are 
equally intriguing. For instance, in 1930, the United States made what many 
economists considered a critical mistake in trying to address the economic crisis. On 
June 17, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which raised tariffs on imported goods and 
set off a round of escalating world-wide tariffs, was passed.75 By the end of the year, 
1,350 banks had been suspended or closed.76 
In 1931, the U.S. and other nations continued to make critical mistakes. On 
March 31, the Davis-Bacon Act, which required prevailing union wages to be paid 
on federal construction projects and forced labor rates up, became law. On 
September 21, Britain went off the gold standard. It was followed by Japan in 
December of the same year. Domestically, the New York Federal Reserve Bank 
raised its discount rate from 1.5% to 2.5% on October 16, and from 2.5% to 3.5% on 
October 23. This is contrary to presently accepted economic principles, which 
emphasize lowering the cost of money to spur economic growth.77 On December 11, 
the New York Bank of the United States collapsed, joining 2,293 banks that 
suspended operations during the year.78 
In 1932, the U.S. adopted additional practices contrary to what are now 
considered appropriate means to address economic slowdowns. On June 6, the 
Revenue Act of 1932 was passed, which was the largest peacetime tax increase in 
U.S. history to that point.79 In August, the Norris-La Guardia Act was passed, which 
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outlawed yellow-dog contracts, protected unions from antitrust actions, and raised 
labor rates. The Glass-Steagall Act was also passed that year, which eliminated 
competition between banks and securities companies by keeping each industry 
separate, thereby eliminating competition that could have driven down prices.80 By 
the end of 1932, another 1,493 banks had failed.81 
C.  Aftermath 
Unlike the previously discussed Dutch, French, and English financial crises 
which were domestic events, the Great Crash, which led to the Great Depression, 
was a world-wide event, and was felt throughout the world. 
D.  Summary 
Certainly, the lead-up to the Great Crash was a classic bubble, with human 
emotion and greed driving prices up. The same human factors drove prices down in 
the days, months, and years following the crash. Foreign direct investment was not a 
factor, although some economists argue that foreign trade was a factor since higher 
tariffs greatly reduced foreign markets. According to some economists, exchange 
rates were somewhat relevant since many countries returned to the gold standard in 
the years before the crash, which appreciated their currencies thereby increasing the 
cost of their goods and reducing their exports. Poor economic fundamentals existed 
as business people and bankers abandoned industry and lending to invest in the stock 
market, and in the months before the crash economic indicators slowed. Of course, 
this may have been a self-reinforcing factor, since investors seeing the lower 
economic numbers may have been more encouraged to panic. Unlike previously 
discussed crises, there was a real estate boom before the crisis. Investors reinvested 
stock profits in real estate. Many investors were uneducated, since for the first time 
the middle and lower classes began to participate in the stock market. Program 
trading, which did not arise until computers and the 20th century, was not relevant, 
but technology was. This was the era of many new technological developments and 
integration into society, including airplanes, automobiles, telephones, electricity, and 
appliances, all of which increased the sense of wonder and expectation of continued 
growth. Mergers and acquisitions were involved, since founders were using both to 
drive up the prices of their stocks. Obviously, the result was an economic crash 
following the panic when shares could not be sold for anything approaching their 
acquisition costs. Sadly, the effect spread throughout the world, with most countries 
affected by the crisis.  
V.  CRASH 1987 
The year 1987 also hosted its version of “Black” October stock market days. 
While 1929 gave us Black Thursday (October 24) and Black Tuesday (October 29), 
in 1987 it was Black Monday (October 19)82 when stock markets around the world 
crashed. Unlike the previously discussed crashes, this one started in Asia, 
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specifically Hong Kong. From there it followed the business day west through 
Europe and ultimately to the United States. 
A. Boom 
The origins of this boom can be traced to investor attitudes and beliefs, similar to 
those in the previous crashes. In 1986, the U.S. economy was growing, but at a 
slower rate than in the past, in what was called a “soft landing.” Investors and the 
stock market, however, continued to be positive through August 1987, when the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) peaked at 2722.4 on August 25.83 This was 
44% over the previous year’s closing on December 31, 1986. A brief summary of 
some of the key events of 1987 indicates why it can be summarized as the year of 
cheap money, mergers, greed, and insider trading. 
January 1 opened with bond yields near their lowest levels in nine years. 
Corporations were taking advantage of the cheap money by issuing tremendous 
amounts of debt. In the previous year, for instance, more than $200 billion in notes 
were issued, which was twice the amount issued in 1985. This was also the time 
when junk bonds (bonds offering high returns and high risk, and for this reason 
considered below “investment grade”) became popular.84 On January 8, the DJIA 
broke the 2,000 level for the first time in its history, closing at 2,002.25. Trading was 
194.5 million shares, with most other stock indices setting records. Later that month 
on January 22, DJIA jumped 51.60 points to 2145.67, the largest one-day point rise 
ever. Although not a percentage record, the increase reinforced the public’s attitude 
that stocks were a great investment. The euphoria only lasted a day, as the Dow 
dropped 114 points in 71 minutes the next day. Since program trading was blamed 
for the drop, confidence in the market remained strong.85 
In February, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) began to put its stamp 
on the year. On February 5, the SEC announced an extension of its insider trading 
investigation beyond Ivan Boesky to Drexel Burnham Lambert and others. On the 
9th, former Lazard Frères & Co. investment banker Robert M. Wilkins was sentenced 
to two concurrent prison terms for participating in insider trading with Dennis B. 
Levine. On the 12th, three members of Goldman, Sachs, and Kidder were arrested for 
insider trading. On the 13th, Martin Siegel of Kidder Peabody and Drexel Burnham 
pleaded guilty to insider trading.86 Many doubted whether the underlying merger 
mania could continue, since investment bankers who made it possible were 
tarnished. 
March continued the insider-trading saga, as the SEC charged Merrill Lynch’s 
Nahum Vaskevith on March 11 with insider trading for giving information to Israel-
based David Sofer about pending mergers. The next day, PaineWebber broker Gary 
Elder and other employees were indicted for tax evasion for assisting clients to filter 
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money out of their accounts to avoid gains and taxes. On March 19, Boyd Jeffries, 
president of Jeffries & Co., a West Coast broker, pleaded guilty to manipulating 
stock prices. On March 21, American Express Shearson Lehman Brothers and 
Salomon Brothers were subpoenaed for stock manipulation. Nevertheless, the 
quarter ended on a positive note, with stock prices surging 22% worldwide. 
Companies took advantage of the stock price increase to issue new shares, estimated 
at $87.7 billion in the first quarter, a 27% increase year-over-year. However, as the 
dollar continued to decline in value, stock and bond holders were hurt. The Dow 
Jones fell 57.39 to 2278.41 on March 30, and bond prices fell to their lowest levels 
since the previous fall.87 
On April 9, a former director of the Federal Reserve Bank, Robert Rough, was 
accused of leaking information to Bevill, Bresler, & Schulman. Treasury bond rates 
began to rise – up to 8% for the first time in 13 months. On the 23rd, bond fund 
redemptions accelerated. Many investors were concerned that the falling dollar could 
revive inflation. By the 27th, the SEC’s Drexel Burnham Lambert investigation was 
focusing on the Beverly Hills office of Michael Milken, who was considered the 
originator of junk bonds. On the 29th, dollar and bond prices fell after the U.S. House 
of Representatives passed a bill designed to reduce trade surpluses held by many 
Asian nations, particularly Japan. Investors feared that foreign investors would cease 
to participate in the Treasury’s quarterly funding auction, which would drive bond 
prices up even further.88 
In May, the focus was on stocks, stock prices, and rising values. Unfortunately, 
some of the best performers had great stories but limited or no sales. On the other 
hand, some investment banks were considering personnel cuts in expectation of a 
coming economic slowdown.89 The emerging pessimism was blamed on widening 
insider trading scandals, increasing inflation and rising bond yields that made 
corporate loans more expensive. 
In June, the insider trading scandal continued, with Kidder Peabody on June 4 
paying a record $25.3 million to settle insider trading charges against it.90 
In July, inflation became an issue, as crude oil prices hit $22.39 per barrel, up 
from $16.40 in March. This 11% year-to-date rise increased inflation concerns. The 
anxiety drove yields on 30-year government bonds higher. On July 22, bond rates 
reached 8.79%, the highest since June. This was the start of a rise that would 
continue until rates reached 10.22% on August 15.91 
The month of August saw more of the same – increasing stock and bond prices. 
On August 24, 30-year government bonds hit 8.98%, while on the 25th the Dow hit 
2722.42, as noted, its high for the year, and a number that would not be equaled 
again until August 24, 1989.92 
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Behind the stock market rise was the continuing mergers mania, which had 
accelerated in 1986 and became even stronger in 1987, as shown in Charts 1 and 2 of 
the ten largest transactions in those two years. The ten largest transactions in 1986 
totaled $28.94 billion for an average of $2.894 billion per transaction. In 1987, the 
ten largest transactions totaled $34.179 billion or an average of $3.418 billion. This 
was an 18% increase in one year. 
 





   
Sperry Burroughs 4,394 
Safeway SSI Holdings 4,198 
Borg-Warner Minstar 3,856 
Owens-Illinois Kohlberg Kravis 3,632 
Allied Stores Campean 3,500 
Viacom National Amusements 3,400 
Chesebrough-Pond's Unilever 3,093 
Celanese American Hoechst 2,867 
 Total  28,940 










   
Standard Oil (Ohio) British Petroleum 7,565 
Southland Thompson 4,004 
Borg-Warner Private group 3,764 
Owens-Illinois Private group 3,688 
Viacom National Amusements 3,107 
Chesebrough-Pond's Unilever 3,095 
Celanese American Hoechst 2,726 
Burlington Private group 2,156 
Hospital Corp. HealthTrust 2,100 
Cadillac Fairview JMB Realty 1,974 
 Total  34,179 
 Average  3,418 
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B.  Bust 
On September 29, 1987, 30-year Treasury bills sold at 9.77%, the highest since 
December 1985. Stock prices were beginning their decline, however, with the Dow 
falling 4.8% to 2590.6 from its high in August.93 
On October 6, the Dow fell 3.47% to 2548.63 on heavy volume of 175.6 million 
shares. By October 12, confidence among major investment banks was deteriorating. 
Salomon, for instance, dismissed 12% of its municipal bond staff. The next day, 
Kidder Peabody announced it would cut its municipal bond trading operations by 
35%.94 
Many commentators, including the Federal Reserve Bank, trace the 1987 
collapse to Wednesday, October 14, when two events occurred.95 First, the Ways and 
Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives filed legislation eliminating 
tax benefits for financing mergers.96 The proposal would eliminate tax deductions for 
some interest expenses and would tax “greenmail” – payments made by companies 
to corporate raiders to buy back their stock at above-market prices in exchange for 
the raider agreeing not to take over the company. Investors realized, if the proposed 
legislation passed, companies would be less valuable as take-over targets. Second, 
the U.S. Commerce Department announced the trade deficit for August, which was 
considerably above expectations. As a result of these two events, the dollar declined 
amid expectations that the Federal Reserve would tighten monetary policy.97 Interest 
rates also rose, putting further downward pressure on equity prices since higher 
interest rates meant lower profits. The net effect was that on October 14, the DJIA 
dropped 95.46 points (a then record) to 2412.70.98 
On Thursday, October 15, equity markets continued to decline. The DJIA fell 
another 58 points, which meant it was down over 12% from its August 25 all-time 
high. Some of this decrease was attributed to anxiety among institutions, especially 
pension funds, and among individual investors, leading to a movement of funds from 
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stocks into the relative safety of bonds.99 There was also heavy selling during the last 
half hour of the day amid heavier-than-usual activity by portfolio insurers.100  
On Friday, October 16, the markets in London were closed due to what became 
known as the Great Storm of 1987.101 In the U.S., ongoing anxiety among investors 
was augmented by technical factors. Various stock index options expired on Friday; 
since price movements during the previous two days had eliminated many at-the-
money options, investors could not roll over their positions into new contracts for 
hedging purposes. This pushed investors into futures markets, where they sold 
futures contracts as a hedge against falling stocks, a technique similar to that used by 
portfolio insurers. Increased sales of futures contracts created a price discrepancy 
between the value of stocks in the futures market and their value on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE). Index arbitrage traders reportedly took advantage of this 
price discrepancy to buy futures and sell stocks, which created increased additional 
downward pressures on the NYSE.102  
By the end of the day on Friday, markets had fallen considerably. The DJIA 
closed down another 108.35 points to close at 2246.74 on record volume, while the 
Standard and Poor’s Index (S&P) 500 was down over nine percent for the week. The 
decrease was one of the largest one-week declines in decades, and helped set the 
stage for turmoil the following week.103 As in 1929, investors worried over the 
weekend about their stock investments and whether they should stay in the market. 
Additionally, following Friday’s close, computer models used by portfolio 
insurers suggested that they should sell more stocks and futures contracts on 
Monday.104 As a result of perceived stock overhangs (sizeable blocks of shares 
which if released would flood the market and put downward pressure on prices), 
mutual funds also wanted to sell shares.105 Some institutions anticipated these 
portfolio insurance sales and mutual fund redemptions, and prepared to pre-empt 
them by selling first on Monday.106  
When Monday, October 19, finally arrived, additional events occurred that 
influenced the crash. First, stock prices in Far Eastern markets began to fall in the 
morning of October 19, as Asian investors indicated they had also spent the weekend 
worrying about their investments. Later that morning, two U.S. warships shelled an 
Iranian oil platform in the Persian Gulf in response to Iran's missile attack on the 
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U.S. flagged ship MV Sea Isle City, giving rise to concerns over the stability of oil 
supply.107  
The result of these developments during the previous week, over the weekend 
and on that day was substantial selling pressure on the NYSE at the Monday opening 
with a large imbalance between the number of sell and buy orders.108 As a result, 
many specialists did not open for trading during the first hour.109 According to the 
SEC, “by 10:00, 95 S&P stocks, representing 30% of the index value, were still not 
open.”110 The Wall Street Journal reported that 11 of the 30 stocks in the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average opened late.111 Since the value of stock market indices are 
calculated using most recent price quotes for underlying stocks, with stocks not 
trading, some of the quotes were stale, which meant that the values of these indexes 
did not decline as much as they should have.112 By contrast, the futures market 
opened on time with heavy selling. With stale quotes in the cash market and 
declining prices in the futures market, a gap grew between the value of stock indexes 
in the cash market and the futures market.113 Many index arbitrage traders took 
advantage of the gap and entered sell-at-market orders on the NYSE. 
As prices fell, index arbitragers discovered they had sold stocks considerably 
below what they had been expecting. Since they would not be getting as much from 
the sales as anticipated, they tried to cover the remaining exposures by buying in the 
futures market. This precipitated a temporary rebound in prices.114 As stocks prices 
continued to fall, however, portfolio insurers’ models prompted them to sell in both 
the cash and futures markets.115 These sales eliminated the temporary rally. 
Some NYSE specialists reportedly tried to lean against the wind and support 
their stocks. The SEC reported that many specialists were heavy buyers early on 
Monday.116 However, as prices fell and their positions deteriorated, the specialists 
lost the ability to defend the stocks they were assigned.117  
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Government reaction to the decline unfortunately adversely affected the market. 
In comments following a speech on Monday, the SEC Chairman reportedly said that 
“there is some point, and I don’t know what point that is, that I would be interested 
in talking to the New York Stock Exchange about a temporary, very temporary, halt 
in trading.”118 This news broke shortly after 1:00 p.m. and started rumors in futures 
exchanges that the NYSE would close, prompting further sales as traders reportedly 
worried that a market close would lock them into their existing positions.119  
The Black Monday decline was the largest one-day percentage decline in stock 
market history.120 On Tuesday, October 20, 1987, before the opening of financial 
markets, the Federal Reserve issued a short statement: “The Federal Reserve, 
consistent with its responsibilities as the Nation’s central bank, affirmed today its 
readiness to serve as a source of liquidity to support the economic and financial 
system.”121 This statement reportedly contributed significantly toward supporting 
market sentiment.122 Perhaps spurred by this event and despite precipitous declines in 
foreign stock markets overnight, the NYSE rebounded at the open.123  
Nevertheless, trading on Tuesday was impaired. Over the course of the day, 
about seven percent of stocks, including some of the most active, were closed for 
trading by specialists as order imbalances made maintaining orderly markets 
difficult.124 In addition, prior to the start of trading, the NYSE had moved to prevent 
index arbitrage program traders from using the designated order turnaround (DOT) 
system to execute trades, which may have affected the depth of the market. 
Program trading patterns were also impaired. If portfolio insurers are active 
sellers in the futures market and push down prices there, index arbitragers use this as 
an opportunity to buy in the futures market and sell in the cash market. Their action 
mitigates pressure in the futures market. However, index arbitrage traders were not 
active, due, in part, to NYSE’s restrictions regarding use of the DOT system. This 
further decoupled prices in the futures and cash markets.125  
With a number of trading halts for individual stocks on the NYSE and the 
possibility that the exchange might close, trading of many stock-index derivative 
products was suspended on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) at 11:45 
a.m. and on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange CME at 12:15 p.m.126 These closures 
completed the de-linkage between the futures and cash markets, and stocks on the 
NYSE began to rebound. The rise in the market was attributed in part to the removal 
of a “billboard” effect as the futures quotes had continually suggested that futures 
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market participants expected the cash market to decline, and to a further reduction in 
selling associated with portfolio insurance.127 
However, the stock market declined again once the futures markets re-opened 
just after 1:00 p.m.. Later in the afternoon, there was a sustained rise in financial 
markets as corporations announced stock buyback programs to support demand for 
their stocks.128 Corporations had started announcing these programs Monday 
afternoon, but it was not until part way through Tuesday that a critical mass had 
formed. 
Ironically, the DJIA was positive for the 1987 calendar year. It had opened on 
January 2, 1987, at 1,897 points and closed on December 31, 1987, at 1,939 points. 
The DJIA, however, did not regain its August 25, 1987 closing high of 2,722 points 
until almost two years later. 
Various explanations for the crisis have been suggested. To some observers, the 
reason for the collapse was unstable international financial conditions. Richard Sylla, 
for instance, points to macroeconomic causes, such as international disputes about 
foreign exchange and interest rates, and fears about inflation.129 Other writers point 
to the dispute in monetary policy among G7 industrialized nations, in which the 
United States, wanting to prop up the dollar and restrict inflation, tightened policy 
faster than the European nations. Similarly, some writers point to U.S. pressure on 
Germany to change its monetary policy as one of the factors that unnerved investors 
in the run-up to the crash.130 A similar view looking at underlying causes is that the 
crash was caused when the dollar-backed Hong Kong stock exchange collapsed, 
causing a crisis in confidence. Some technical analysts claim that the cause was the 
collapse of the U.S. and European bond markets, which caused interest-sensitive 
stock groups like savings and loans and money center banks to plunge as well. In 
this inter-market relationship, bond markets affect interest-rate-sensitive stocks, 
which in turn lead the general stock market turns.131 
C.  Aftermath 
As noted, similar to 1929, the crash affected major financial markets around the 
world. By the end of October, stock markets in Hong Kong had fallen 45.5%, 
Australia 41.8%, Spain 31%, the United Kingdom 26.4%, the United States 22.68%, 
and Canada 22.5%. New Zealand’s market was hit especially hard, falling about 
60% from its 1987 peak, and taking several years to recover.132 Because the collapse 
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was world-wide, particularly since it started in Asia where program trading is 
limited, the collapse cannot be treated as the sole result of technology. Certainly, 
technology augmented the downward spiral, but it did not start the spiral.  
D.  Summary 
Chart 4 summarizes the Crash of 1987. The rise in value up to the crash was 
driven, in large part, by human emotion and greed. A popular quote of the year was, 
“Greed is good,” which was a simplification of the actual quote. 
Greed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right. Greed works. 
Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures, the essence of the evolutionary 
spirit. Greed, in all of its forms; greed for life, for money, for love, 
knowledge, has marked the upward surge of mankind and greed, you 
mark my words, will not only save Teldar Paper, but that other 
malfunctioning corporation called the USA.”133 
Foreign direct investment, however, was not a factor, although some economists 
believe that one of the underlying causes was concern about increasing trade 
imbalances, foreign exchange reserve increases, and the desire of the U.S. to protect 
the dollar. These issues, however, concern foreign trade, not investment. Poor 
economic fundamentals do not seem to be a key issue. Although the economy was 
undergoing a soft landing, as noted above, it was still growing – just not as fast as in 
the past. There may, however, have been some underlying issues in the international 
financial markets. There was no significant real estate boom before the crisis, so this 
was not an element. Many investors were not well educated, many of whom were 
putting money into 401(k) investment plans and entering the stock market for the 
first time. Program trading was a very strong factor, although as noted above, not the 
only factor. It had more of an impact on the downward spiral, but was still 
significant for that reason. Similarly, technology innovation was important since 
computers were behind the program trading. Unlike the other crises, however, 
technology did not drive prices up during the bubble as a reason or incentive to 
invest. Instead, it drove the prices down through program trading. Mergers and 
acquisitions were involved, since many companies were being acquired at this time. 
It was the era of the Barbarians at the Gate134 and other major acquisitions. On the 
downside, the result was an economic crash following the panic selling of shares by 
individuals and institutions. This spilled over to all major financial markets 
throughout the world, with most countries affected by the crisis.  
VI.  ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 1997 
The Asian Financial Crisis was primarily focused in Asia. It struck some of the 
strongest and fastest growing economies, not only in Asia, but in the world. As we 
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will see, in many ways it had a more significant impact than any of the other crises 
described in this article. 
A.  Boom 
Until 1997, two-thirds of all developing-country foreign direct investment (FDI) 
went to South, East and South-East Asia. The area was particularly attractive to 
foreign investors looking for high rates of return. In 1995, for instance, the area 
received an estimated $65 billion of inflows.135 Asia was also home to most of the 
fastest growing economies in the world.136 In the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan generated growth rates of 8-12%, 
and were known as the Asian Tigers.137 Along with Indonesia and Malaysia, they 
became the models for other emerging economies on how to create growth. The 
World Bank and others referred to them as the Asian economic miracle.138 
Preliminary to the collapse is a common story seen in each of the previous crises, 
with the high rate of money inflow leading to predictable economic results. In the 
perfect definition of inflation, with too much money chasing a limited number of 
assets, prices rise. This meant higher interest rates, which attracted even more 
investors seeking higher rates. As a result, the region's economies received a large 
inflow of money, but experienced a dramatic run-up in asset prices. 
Thailand's economy, for instance, developed into a bubble fueled by "hot 
money". Short-term capital flow, however, was expensive (requiring high rates) and 
demanded quick profit and quick return. A similar situation developed in Malaysia 
and Indonesia, the latter of which had the added feature of "crony capitalism".139 
Under crony-capitalism, development money was invested in a largely uncontrolled 
manner based not on credit analysis but ties to political decision makers.140  
By the mid-1990s, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea were using high interest 
rates and fixed exchange rates to encourage foreign inflows of money, most of which 
came in as short-term debt denominated in dollars rather than long-term equity in 
local currencies. The disadvantage of this approach was that excessive borrowing 
meant excessive exposure to foreign exchange risk in both the financial and 
corporate sectors, since devaluations would mean increased debt load. 
Unfortunately, much of the money was being invested in real estate and not in 
industrial growth. As a result, the money inflow drove up asset prices without 
leading to economic growth. 
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B.  Bust 
In the mid-1990s, changes in the U.S. economy had a serious impact on the 
Asian economic environment. As the U.S. economy recovered from recession in the 
early 1990s, the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank under Alan Greenspan raised U.S. 
interest rates to head off inflation. This made the U.S. a more attractive investment 
destination relative to Southeast Asia, and raised the value of the U.S. dollar. For 
Southeast Asian nations that had currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar, the higher 
U.S. dollar caused their exports to become more expensive and less competitive in 
the global markets. It also meant that imports such as oil became more expensive. 
Both factors created (or in some cases, increased) trade deficits, deteriorating current 
accounts and causing balance of payment problems. 
As a result, excessive asset prices began to collapse, causing individuals and 
companies to default on debt obligations. The resulting panic among foreign lenders 
led to a large withdrawal of credit from the crisis countries, causing a credit crunch 
and further bankruptcies. In addition, as foreign investors attempted to withdraw 
their money, foreign exchange markets were flooded with the currencies of the crisis 
countries, putting further depreciative pressure on their exchange rates.  
To prevent currency values collapsing, these countries' governments increased 
domestic interest rates to exceedingly high levels (to help diminish flight of capital 
by making domestic lending more attractive to foreign and domestic investors), and 
intervened in the exchange market by using their foreign exchange reserves to buy 
excess domestic currency at the fixed exchange rates. Neither of these policy 
responses was adequate to remedy the problem. The high interest rates, which are 
risky even in healthy economies, damaged the fragile economies in Asia. Also, the 
central banks only had limited foreign reserves, which they soon began to exhaust. 
When it became clear that the countries could not stop the tide of fleeing capital, 
government officials stopped defending their fixed exchange rates and allowed their 
currencies to float. As noted above, the resulting depreciated value of those 
currencies meant that foreign currency-denominated liabilities grew even more 
expensive in domestic currency terms. This caused more bankruptcies and further 
expanded the crisis. 
A number of explanations for the crisis have been suggested. To some 
economists, increasing Chinese exports contributed to export growth slowdown for 
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).141 They note that 
China had begun to increase exports in the 1990s following the adoption of export-
related reforms, which could have reduced exports from other Asian countries Other 
economists disagree, noting that both ASEAN and China experienced simultaneous 
rapid export growth in the early 1990s.142  
Another possible argument is that the sudden shock could be attributable to the 
handover of Hong Kong sovereignty on July 1, 1997. During the 1990s, hot money 
flew into the Southeast Asia region but investors were often ignorant of the actual 
fundamentals or risk profiles of the respective economies. The uncertainty regarding 
the future of Hong Kong led investors to shrink even further from Asia, exacerbating 
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economic conditions in the area, and subsequently leading to the devaluation of the 
Thai baht the next day on July 2, 1997.143  
To ASEAN government leaders, the crisis was caused by currency manipulators. 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, for instance, accused George Soros 
of ruining Malaysia's economy by "setting the fires that turned South East Asia into 
a Haze Zone."144 Blaming foreign exchange traders enjoys little support among 
economists, who argue that no single investor had enough impact on the market to 
successfully manipulate the currencies' values. More likely, the crisis was a result of 
ASEAN members’ failure to prepare. For instance, at the 30th ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting in Subang Jaya, Malaysia, the ministers emphasized the importance of 
international financial cooperation by signing a joint declaration on July 25, 1997 
expressing serious concern and calling for further intensification of ASEAN's 
cooperation in this regard.145 Unfortunately, on that same day, the central bankers of 
most of the affected countries were at the EMEAP (Executive Meeting of East Asia 
Pacific) meeting in Shanghai, but failed to make operational their New Arrangement 
to Borrow. This failure was not a recent one. A year earlier, the finance ministers of 
these same countries had attended the 3rd Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) finance ministers meeting in Kyoto, Japan on March 17, 1996, but were 
unable to double the amounts available under their General Agreement to Borrow 
and their Emergency Finance Mechanism.  
Many writers have considered behavioral reasons for the crisis. To some, such as 
Joseph Stiglitz, behavior was more important than any underlying economic 
factors.146 Several, including Jeffrey Sachs, have described the Asian Financial Crisis 
as a classic bank run prompted by a sudden risk shock.147 Others, such as Frederic 
Mishkin, refer to the "herd mentality" among investors that magnified a small risk in 
the real economy.148 Another group of economists, including Paul Krugman, argue 
that the Asian crisis was created not by market psychology or technology, but by 
policies that distorted lender-borrower incentives. The increase of money inflows 
meant increased credit was available, which increased asset prices to an 
unsustainable level. While the latter authors do not refer to this as market 
psychology, and prefer to call it distorted lender-borrower incentives,149 the essence 
was a flow of money not justified by the underlying financials. In this sense, it was 
excessively speculative money.  
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C.  Aftermath 
The crisis had significant macro-level effects, including sharp reductions in 
currencies values, stock markets, and other asset prices of several Asian countries.150 
More long-term consequences included reversal of the relative gains made in the 
boom years preceding the crisis.  
Nominal U.S. dollar GDP of ASEAN fell by $9.2 billion in 1997 and $218.2 
billion (31.7%) in 1998. The South Korea decline in 1998 of $170.9 billion was 
equal to 33.1% of its 1997 GDP. Nominal U.S. dollar GDP per capital fell in 1997 
42.3% in Indonesia, 21.2% in Thailand, 19% in Malaysia, 18.5% in South Korea, 
and 12.5% in the Philippines.151 Per capita income (measured by purchasing power 
parity) in Indonesia declined from $4,600 to $3,700; in Thailand it declined from 
$8,800 to $8,300 between 1997 and 2005; in Malaysia it declined from $11,100 to 
$10,400.152 In contrast, over the same period, world per capita income rose from 
$6,500 to $9,300.153 In 2005, the economy of Indonesia was smaller than it had been 
in 1997, an impact, that we will see is greater than the Great Depression on the U.S. 
The decline in GDP reflects the great number of businesses that collapsed. As a 
consequence, millions of people fell below the poverty line in 1997–1998. Indonesia 
and Thailand were the countries most affected by the crisis, as indicated in Chart 3. 
 
Chart 3: Effect of Asian Financial Crisis 1997 on Various Countries154 
 

















 Indonesia Rupiah 205 34 83.4 2,380 14,150 83.2 
 Malaysia Ringgit 90 55 38.9 2.5 4.1 39.0 
 Philippines Peso 75 47 37.3 26.3 42 37.4 
 South Korea Won 430 283 34.2 850 1,290 34.1 
 Thailand Baht 170 102 40.0 24.5 41 40.2 
 
The economic crisis also led to a political upheaval, most notably culminating in 
the resignations of President Suharto in Indonesia and Prime Minister General 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh in Thailand. There was a general rise in anti-Western 
sentiment, with George Soros and the IMF in particular targets for criticisms. Heavy 
U.S. investment in Thailand ended, replaced by mostly European investment, though 
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Japanese investment was sustained. Islamic and other separatist movements 
intensified in Southeast Asia as central authorities weakened.155  
Politically, there were some benefits. In several countries, particularly South 
Korea and Indonesia, there was renewed push for improved corporate governance. 
Rampaging inflation weakened the authority of the Suharto regime and led to its 
toppling in 1998, as well as accelerating East Timor's independence.156  
Within East Asia, the bulk of investment and a significant amount of economic 
weight shifted from Japan and ASEAN to China and India.157  
Outside Asia, after the Asian crisis, international investors were reluctant to lend 
to developing countries, leading to economic slowdowns in developing countries in 
many parts of the world. The powerful negative shock also sharply reduced the price 
of oil, which reached a low of $8 per barrel towards the end of 1998, causing a 
financial pinch in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
nations and other oil exporters. This reduction in oil revenue contributed to the 1998 
Russian financial crisis, which in turn caused long-term capital management in the 
United States to collapse after losing $4.6 billion in 4 months. A wider collapse in 
the financial markets was avoided when Alan Greenspan and the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York organized a $3.625 billion bail-out. Major emerging economies 
Brazil and Argentina also fell into crisis in the late 1990s.158  
The crisis in general led to a global backlash against the Washington Consensus 
("Stabilize, privatize, and liberalize")159 and institutions such as the IMF and World 
Bank. A number of critiques were leveled against the conduct of the IMF during the 
crisis, including by former World Bank economist Joseph Stiglitz.160 Four major 
rounds of world trade talks since the crisis in Seattle, Doha, Cancún and Hong Kong 
have failed to produce a significant agreement as developing countries have become 
more assertive, and nations are increasingly turning toward regional or bilateral free 
trade agreements (FTAs) as alternatives to global institutions. Many nations learned 
from the crisis and quickly built up foreign exchange reserves as a hedge against 
attacks, including Japan, China and South Korea. Pan Asian currency swaps were 
introduced in the event of another crisis. Many nations, such as Brazil, Russia, and 
India, and most of East Asia, began copying the Japanese model of weakening their 
currencies, and restructuring their economies to create a current account surplus to 
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build large foreign currency reserves. This has led to an ever increasing funding for 
U.S. treasury bonds, allowing or aiding housing (in 2001–2005) and stock asset 
bubbles (in 1996–2000) to develop in the United States. 
D.  Summary 
Chart 4 summarizes the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. The bubble was driven 
by a number of factors, including human emotion and greed, but also by non-
alignment of debtor and creditor interests. Foreign direct investment was a very 
important factor as many currencies collapsed when Asian borrowers tried to repay 
short-term loans denominated in dollars from long-term assets purchased with the 
loans. The result was further weakening of exchange rates. Hidden under the veneer 
of apparent strong economic growth were a number of economic issues, including 
concerns over the transfer of Hong Kong (the center of Asia’s growth) to China, 
trade imbalances, rising interest rates due to too much foreign money chasing too 
few Asian goods, and nonperforming loans as the crisis continued. There was a 
limited real estate boom before the crisis, as many investors had diversified their 
holdings into Asian real estate. Many foreign investors were not knowledgeable 
about Asian markets, but were following the herd instincts of other investors. Many 
had never traveled to Asia and knew little more about the area than newspaper 
stories. Technology innovation was important since many investors became 
interested in Asia due to U.S. and European companies outsourcing, including 
sophisticated and highly-technical parts and components, to Asia. Mergers and 
acquisitions were not involved, since most investors were putting the money into 
domestic companies in Asia as debt, rather than equity. The result of the collapse 
was economic crashes as exchange rates collapsed. The resulting company and bank 
closings forced economies further downward. There was, however, no panic selling, 
but rather a gradual depreciation of currencies and stocks. The Asian Financial Crisis 
was centered in Asia, as its name implies, but managed to have some spill over to 
other countries around the world.  
VII.  DOT-COM BUBBLE 2000 
Also known as the information technology (IT) bubble161 or technology-media-
telecoms (TMT) bubble, the dot-com bubble was a speculative bubble covering 
roughly 1995–2000. It reached a climax on March 10, 2000 when the NASDAQ 
index peaked at 5132.52. During the bubble, the equity value of stock markets in the 
U.S. and England rose rapidly, driven primarily by growth in the emerging Internet 
and hi-tech sectors. The period was marked by the founding (and, in many cases, 
spectacular failure) of new Internet-based companies commonly referred to as dot-
coms. Many companies found it possible to increase their stock prices by simply 
adding an “e-“ (for electronic) prefix to their name, which one author called “prefix 
investing,”162 or a “.com” suffix to their name. Many dot-coms also named 
themselves with onomatopoeic nonsense words that they hoped would be memorable 
and not easily confused with a competitor. 
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A.  Boom 
Low interest rates in 1998 and1999 increased the availability of start-up capital. 
Combined with the novelty of hi-tech stocks and the difficulty of valuing them, the 
result was rapidly increasing stock prices. An unprecedented amount of personal 
investing also occurred during the boom, and the press reported the phenomenon of 
people quitting their jobs to become full-time day traders.163 
As the stock valuation of dot-com companies rose at record-setting rates, venture 
capitalists and other investors moved faster and with less caution than usual. 
Price/earning (P/E) ratios, for instance, became less important than first to market 
and risk mitigation by starting many companies and letting the market decide which 
would succeed.  
Although a number of the new entrepreneurs had realistic plans and 
administrative ability, many more of them lacked these characteristics but were able 
to sell their ideas to investors because of the novelty of the dot-com concept. A 
prototypical "dot-com" company's business model, for instance, relied on networking 
effects, while operating at a sustained net loss to build market share (or mind share). 
In the pursuit of a larger share, companies offered their services or end products for 
free in the expectation that they could build enough brand awareness to charge 
profitable rates later for their services. The motto “get big fast" reflected this 
strategy.164 A similar phrase was "Get large or get lost.”165 
The dot-com model was inherently flawed: a vast number of companies all had 
the same business plan of monopolizing their respective sectors through network 
effects. Even if the approach was sound, there could only be one network-effects 
winner in each sector. Most companies in the same sector would have to fail. In fact, 
many sectors could not support even one company powered entirely by network 
effects. 
The concept of sustained net loss while building share was made possible by 
outside investor money. The most common methods were venture capital 
investments and initial public offering (IPO) of stock to raise a substantial amount of 
money, even though the dot-com had never made a profit or, in some cases, earned 
any revenue. These funds were then used to pay expenses during the loss period. As 
a result, a company's lifespan was measured by its burn rate, that is, the rate at which 
a non-profitable company lacking a viable business model ran through its capital.  
Many company founders made vast fortunes when their companies were bought 
out at an early stage in the dot-com stock market bubble. These early successes made 
the bubble even more buoyant as investors looked for the next take-off business. 
Historically, the dot-com boom was similar not only to the other crises described 
in this article, but to a number of other technology-inspired booms of the past 
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including railroads in the 1840s, automobiles and radio in the 1920s and transistor 
electronics in the 1950s. 
B.  Bust 
During 1999 and early 2000, the U.S. Federal Reserve increased interest rates six 
times.166 As it did so, the economy began to lose speed. The dot-com bubble peaked, 
numerically, on March 10, 2000, when the technology heavy NASDAQ Composite 
Index167 reached 5,048.62 (intra-day peak 5,132.52), more than double its value just 
a year before.  
The NASDAQ fell slightly after that. One reason for the collapse of the 
NASDAQ (and all dot-coms that collapsed) was the adverse findings of fact in the 
United States v. Microsoft case in federal court.168 The findings, which declared 
Microsoft a monopoly, were widely expected in the weeks before their release on 
April 3.  
Another cause was massive, multi-billion dollar sell orders for major high tech 
stocks (CISCO, IBM, Dell, etc.) that were coincidentally processed simultaneously 
on the Monday morning following the March 10 weekend. This selling resulted in 
the NASDAQ opening roughly four percentage points lower on Monday, March 13, 
from 5,038 to 4,879 – the greatest percentage pre-market selloff for the entire year. 
The massive initial batch of sell orders processed triggered a chain reaction of selling 
that fed off itself as investors, funds, and institutions liquidated positions. In just six 
days, the NASDAQ lost nearly nine percent, falling from roughly 5,050 on March 10 
to 4,580 on March 15.169 
A third reason for decline was accelerated business spending in preparation for 
the Y2K switchover, which had run its course by March 2000. Once the New Year 
had passed without incident, businesses found themselves with all the equipment 
they needed for some time, and business spending quickly declined. This correlates 
quite closely to the peak of U.S. stock markets. The Dow Jones peaked on January 
14, 2000 (closing at 11,722.98)170 and the broader S&P on March 24, 2000 (closing 
at 1,527.46).171 Even more dramatically, the UK's FTSE 100 Index peaked at 
6,950.60 on the last day of trading in 1999 (December 30). Hiring freezes, layoffs, 
and consolidations followed in several industries, especially in the dot-com sector. 
A fourth reason for the bursting of the bubble was poor results of Internet 
retailers during the 1999 Christmas season. This was the first indication that the "Get 
Rich Quick" Internet strategy was flawed for most companies. The retail results were 
made public in March when annual and quarterly reports of public firms were 
released. 
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By 2001 the bubble was deflating at full speed. A majority of the dot-coms 
ceased trading after burning through their venture capital, many having never made a 
net profit. Investors referred to these failed dot-coms as "dot-bombs." 
The impact of the dot-bomb bubble was significant. The stock market crash of 
2000-2002 caused the loss of $5 trillion in the market value of companies from 
March 2000 to October 2002.172  
C.  Aftermath 
The aftermath was also significant. The bubble affected communication 
providers. Convinced that the future economy would require continuing increases in 
broadband access, they went deeply into debt to improve their networks with high-
speed equipment and fiber optic cables. Companies that produced network 
equipment, such as Nortel Networks, were irrevocably damaged by such over-
extension; Nortel declared bankruptcy in early 2009. Companies such as Cisco, 
which did not have any production facilities, but bought from other manufacturers, 
were able to exit the market quickly and avoid the bubble burst. One of the more 
significant players, WorldCom, was found practicing illegal accounting practices to 
exaggerate its profits to meet market expectations. Following the disclosure, 
WorldCom's stock price fell drastically and the company was eventually forced to 
file for bankruptcy – the third largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history. Other 
examples of companies filing for bankruptcy protection include NorthPoint 
Communications, Global Crossing, JDS Uniphase, XO Communications and Covad 
Communications.  
The long-term impact was similarly significant. As noted in the previous section, 
some analysts suggest that the Asian Financial Crisis led into the 2008-10 financial 
crisis. Similarly, some economists believe the crash of the dot-com bubble mutated 
into the housing bubble in the U.S., which transformed into the subprime mortgage 
crisis starting in late 2007.173 
D.  Summary 
Chart 4 summarizes the Dot-com Bubble of 2000. It was driven by a number of 
factors, including, as in the previous crises, human emotion, greed and speculation. 
Foreign direct investment was an important factor, but not the most important, as 
investors sought to invest in U.S. technology companies. Foreign investment flows, 
however, were not material enough to affect exchange rates, which were not an 
important factor. Poor economic fundamentals were underlying start-up and 
technology companies, most of which had no viable business or financials. There 
was a limited real estate boom during the crisis, as many investors diversified their 
holdings into real estate. It became an issue, however, after the crisis and may have 
led to the 2007-10 crisis. Since the relevant technology behind the hi-tech companies 
was new, few investors understood it, meaning they were not educated about the 
businesses in which they invested. Mergers were important since the goal of start-
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ups was to generate sufficient interest to be bought out, and enable founders to cash 
out. The result of the bubble collapse was panic selling, a drop in the stock market, 
and slowing of the U.S. economy, which carried over somewhat to regional and 
global markets. 
VIII.  FINANCIAL CRISIS 2007–10 
The financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 was caused by speculation that led to asset 
overvaluation, which, in turn, triggered a liquidity shortfall in the United States 
banking system.174 It resulted in the collapse of large financial institutions, the 
bailout of banks by national governments, and downturns in stock markets around 
the world. In many areas, the housing market suffered, resulting in numerous 
evictions, foreclosures, and prolonged vacancies. Although it is considered by many 
economists to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
when we compare the crises in this article we will see that it was not.175 It 
contributed to the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated in 
the trillions of U.S. dollars, substantial financial commitments incurred by 
governments, and a significant decline in economic activity.176  
A.  Boom 
The immediate cause of the pre-2007 bubble was low interest rates and large 
investment flows,177 a pattern similar to that observed in the previous crisis. The low 
cost loans created easy credit conditions for a number of years prior to the crisis. 
This fueled a housing construction boom and encouraged debt-financed 
consumption.178 Loans of various types (e.g., mortgage, credit card, and auto) were 
easy to obtain, and consumers assumed an unprecedented debt load.179  
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In turn, this contributed to a housing bubble in the U.S. Between 1997 and 2006, 
the price of the typical American house increased by 124%.180 During the two 
decades ending in 2001, the national median home price ranged from 2.9 to 3.1 times 
median household income. This ratio rose to 4.0 in 2004 and 4.6 in 2006.181 The 
housing bubble resulted in homeowners refinancing their homes at lower interest 
rates, or financing consumer spending by taking out second mortgages secured by 
the price appreciation. 
As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of financial agreements 
called mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, 
greatly increased. An MBS is any form of security backed by one or more securities. 
A CDO essentially places cash payments from multiple mortgages or other debt 
obligations in a single pool, from which the cash is allocated to specific securities in 
a priority sequence. Those securities obtaining cash first receive investment-grade 
ratings from rating agencies. Lower priority securities receive cash thereafter, with 
lower credit ratings but theoretically a higher rate of return on the amount 
invested.182 
Such financial innovation attracted institutions and investors from around the 
world to invest in the U.S. housing market, which increased the boom. The result 
was a giant pool of money (representing $70 trillion in worldwide fixed income 
investments) seeking higher yields than those offered by U.S. Treasury bonds. This 
pool of money had doubled in size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively 
safe, income-generating investments had not grown as fast. Investment banks on 
Wall Street answered this demand with MBSs and CDOs. In effect, Wall Street 
connected this pool of international money to the U.S. mortgage market, with 
enormous fees accruing to those throughout the mortgage supply chain, from the 
mortgage broker selling the loans, to small banks that funded the brokers, to the 
large investment banks behind them.  
By approximately 2003, the supply of mortgages originated at traditional lending 
standards had been exhausted. However, continued strong demand for MBSs and 
CDOs began to drive down lending standards, as long as mortgages could still be 
sold along the supply chain. Eventually, this speculative bubble proved 
unsustainable.183 
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B.  Bust 
Many causes of the financial boom and subsequent bust have been suggested, 
with varying weight assigned by experts.184 Several economists point to increases in 
loan packaging, marketing and incentives such as easy initial terms, and the long-
term trend of rising housing prices. Both had encouraged borrowers to assume 
difficult mortgages in the belief they would be able to quickly refinance at more 
favorable terms. However, once interest rates began to rise and housing prices 
started to drop moderately in 2006–07 in many parts of the U.S., refinancing became 
more difficult.  
The problem was facilitated by credit rating agencies and investors who failed to 
accurately price the risk under these new circumstances, and governments who did 
not adjust their regulatory practices to address 21st century financial markets.185 
As a result, defaults and foreclosure activity increased dramatically as easy initial 
terms expired, home prices failed to go up as anticipated, and adjustable rate 
mortgage’s (ARM’s) interest rates reset higher. Rising default rates on "subprime" 
mortgages and ARM began to increase quickly thereafter. In turn, this led to falling 
home prices, which resulted in homes being worth less than the mortgage loan, thus 
providing the mortgagor a financial incentive to enter foreclosure. 
As defaults rose, major global financial institutions that had borrowed and 
invested heavily in subprime MBSs reported significant losses. The ongoing 
foreclosure epidemic in the U.S. that began in late 2006 drained wealth from 
consumers and eroded the financial strength of banking institutions. Defaults and 
losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the 
housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses were estimated in the 
trillions of U.S. dollars globally.186  
Compounding the housing crisis was the increasing importance of banks and 
non-banks in the economy, a process called financialization. As they become more 
important, they also became more vulnerable. This was particularly true of non-bank 
financial institutions, such as investment banks and hedge funds. Known as part of 
the shadow banking system, these institutions had become as important as 
commercial (depository) banks in providing credit to the U.S. economy. For 
instance, in early 2007 asset-backed commercial paper conduits, structured 
investment vehicles, auction-rate preferred securities, tender option bonds, and 
variable rate demand notes, had a combined asset size of roughly $2.2 trillion. Assets 
financed overnight in triparty repo were $2.5 trillion. Assets held in hedge funds 
were roughly $1.8 trillion. The combined balance sheets of the then five major 
investment banks totaled $4 trillion. Thus, the total amount of credit provided by the 
shadow banking system was at least $10.5 trillion. In comparison, the total assets of 
the top five bank holding companies in the United States at that point were just over 
$6 trillion, with total assets of the entire banking system about $10 trillion. 
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Shadow banks, unfortunately, were not subject to the same regulations as 
regulated banks.187 As a result, they assumed significant debt burdens while 
providing loans, but did not have a financial cushion sufficient to absorb large loan 
defaults or MBS losses.188 When their ability to remain solvent and survive came 
into doubt, investors’ confidences were shaken. When Lehman Brothers took the 
next step and filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, investor confidence in all 
banks was further weakened.189  
Initially, the financial institutions affected were those directly involved in home 
construction and mortgage lending, such as Northern Rock and Countrywide 
Financial, as they could no longer obtain financing through the credit markets. Over 
100 mortgage lenders went bankrupt during 2007 and 2008. Concerns that 
investment bank Bear Stearns would collapse in March 2008 resulted in its fire-sale 
to JP Morgan Chase. The crisis hit its peak in September and October 2008. Several 
major institutions failed, were acquired under duress, or were subject to government 
takeover. These included Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and AIG.190  
During September 2008, the crisis hit its most critical stage, with the equivalent 
of a bank run on the money market mutual funds, which frequently invest in 
commercial paper issued by corporations to fund their operations and payrolls. 
Withdrawals from the money markets totaled $144.5 billion during one week, 
compared to $7.1 billion the week prior. These withdrawals interrupted the ability of 
corporations to rollover (replace) their short-term debt. The U.S. government 
responded by extending insurance for money market accounts analogous to bank 
deposit insurance via a temporary guarantee,191 and with Federal Reserve programs 
to purchase commercial paper. The TED (an acronym formed from T-bill and ED, 
the ticker symbol for Eurodollar futures) spread, an indicator of perceived credit risk 
in the general economy, spiked in July 2007, remained volatile for a year, then 
spiked even higher in September 2008,192 reaching a record 4.65% on October 10, 
2008. 
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Unlike the 1929 depression, the U.S. government reacted in accordance with 
generally accepted economic principles by trying to put money into the economy. In 
a dramatic meeting on September 18, 2008, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson 
and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke met with key legislators to propose a 
$700 billion emergency bailout. Chairman Bernanke stated, "[i]f we don't do this, we 
may not have an economy on Monday."193 The Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act, which implemented the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), was signed 
into law on October 3, 2008.194 Similarly, to offset the decline in lending capacity, 
the U.S. government and U.S. Federal Reserve committed $13.9 trillion, of which 
$6.8 trillion was invested or spent by June 2009.195 
C.  Aftermath 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), large U.S. and European 
banks lost more than $1 trillion from toxic assets and bad loans from January 2007 
to September 2009. These losses were approximately $2.8 trillion from 2007-10. 
U.S. bank losses were estimated at $1 trillion and European bank losses at $1.6 
trillion.196 
Individuals also suffered. Between June 2007 and November 2008, Americans 
lost an average of more than a quarter of their collective net worth. By early 
November 2008, the S&P 500 was down 45 percent from its 2007 high. Housing 
prices had dropped 20% from their 2006 peak, with futures markets signaling a 30-
35% potential drop. Total home equity in the U.S., which was valued at $13 trillion 
at its peak in 2006, dropped to $8.8 trillion by mid-2008 and fell through late 2008. 
Total retirement assets, Americans' second-largest household asset, dropped by 22 
percent, from $10.3 trillion in 2006 to $8 trillion in mid-2008. During the same 
period, savings and investment assets (apart from retirement savings) lost $1.2 
trillion and pension assets lost $1.3 trillion. Taken together, these losses total $8.3 
trillion.197 Since peaking in the second quarter of 2007, household wealth was down 
$14 trillion.198  
Further, U.S. homeowners had extracted significant equity in their homes in the 
years leading up to the crisis, which they could no longer do once housing prices 
collapsed. For instance, free cash used by consumers from home equity extraction 
doubled from $627 billion in 2001 to $1,428 billion in 2005 as the housing bubble 
built, a total of nearly $5 trillion over that period. U.S. home mortgage debt relative 
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to GDP increased from an average of 46% during the 1990s to 73% during 2008, 
reaching $10.5 trillion.  
In the U.S., real gross domestic product, the output of goods and services 
produced by labor and property located in the United States, decreased at an annual 
rate of approximately 6% in the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009, 
from activity in the respective prior year’s period.199 For all of 2009, GDP growth 
was -2.6%.200 The U.S. unemployment rate increased to 10.1% by October 2009, the 
highest rate since 1983 and roughly twice the pre-crisis rate. In August 2010, it was 
still high at 9.5%.201 The average hours worked per week declined to 33 hours, which 
is the lowest level since the government began collecting the data in 1964.202  
Globally, the crisis rapidly developed and spread into a world-wide economic 
shock, resulting in a number of European bank failures, declines in various stock 
indexes, and large reductions in the market value of equities203 and commodities.204 
Derivatives such as credit default swaps also increased the linkage between large 
financial institutions. Moreover, the de-leveraging of financial institutions, as assets 
were sold to pay back obligations that could not be refinanced in frozen credit 
markets, further accelerated the solvency crisis and caused a decrease in 
international trade. 
In 2009, the downturn continued. For 2009, the annualized rate of decline in 
GDP was 14.4% in Germany, 15.2% in Japan, 7.4% in the UK, 9.8% in the Euro 
area, and 21.5% for Mexico.205 Some developing countries that had seen strong 
economic growth saw significant slowdowns. Reductions in growth could be 
attributed to falls in trade, commodity prices, investment, and remittances sent from 
migrant workers (which reached a record $251 billion in 2007, but have fallen in 
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many countries since).206 The stark implications led to a dramatic rise in the number 
of households living below the poverty line.207  
D.  Summary 
Chart 4 summarizes the financial crisis of 2007–10. The bubble was driven by a 
number of factors, including human emotion, greed, and speculation. Foreign direct 
investment was a factor as many foreign investors spurred the bubble on by 
investing in the U.S., particularly U.S. real estate. Exchange rates, however, were not 
a driving force as all economies moved downward at the same time. Underlying the 
crisis was poor economic fundamentals. In the U.S., for instance, readily available 
money had driven up real estate prices that could not be supported. The new 
sophisticated financial instruments were not well understood by the market, which in 
turn meant that investors, regulators and government officials were dealing with 
something they did not comprehend. The result was panic selling and stock market 
crash, followed by an economic crash that affected not only developed countries, but 
ultimately the entire world. 
IX.  SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 
Chart 4 summarizes the financial and economic crises discussed in this article. A 
score of “1” reflects each incident highlighted in gray, and a score of “.5” reflects 
each incident in the previous crises charts highlighted in black, In all eight incidents, 
a bubble (8) was generated by human emotion and greed (7.5) which led to 
speculation (7.5). In four of the crises, including the last three, foreign direct 
investment (2.5) was a factor. Changes in exchange rates, however, were relevant in 
only two of the eight incidents (1.5). Poor economic fundamentals were relevant in 
all of the crises, but scored low (4.5) since it was not a material factor. Real estate 
booms were important in half (3) of the crises. Uneducated investors, frequently 
uneducated about new product offerings, were relevant in all cases (6.5). While new 
products existed in all the crises (7.5), program trading, one form of new technology, 
was relevant in only one case (1). Overall technology innovation was relevant about 
half of the incidents (3.5). Notwithstanding the usual perception, mergers and 
acquisitions were usually not involved (2). Stock market crashes (7.5) leading to 
economic crashes (8) were involved in all instances. The effect was felt in various 
regions (3) and throughout the world (3.5) in all of the last four crashes. 
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Chart 4: Comparison of Major Financial Crises 
 
Elements of Crises Tulipmania Mississippi Scheme 
South Sea 








Bubble                 8 100 
Human emotion and 
greed                 
7.5 93.75 
Speculation                 7.5 93.75 
FDI                 2.5 31.25 
Changes in exchange 
rate                 
1.5 18.75 
Poor economic 
fundamentals                 
4.5 56.25 
Real estate boom before 
crises                 
3 37.5 
Uneducated investors                 6.5 81.25 
New product offered                 7.5 93.75 
Program trading                 1 12.5 
Technology innovation                 3.5 43.75 
Mergers and 
acquisitions                 
2 25 
Panic selling                 7 87.5 
Stock market crash                 7.5 93.75 
Economic crash                 8 100 
Affected group of 
countries                 
3 37.5 
Worldwide effect                 3.5 43.75 
Total 8.5 9 8.5 13.5 13 10 11 10.5   
 
 





As can be seen in Chart 4, the highest number of factors analyzed in this article 
occurred during the two crises closest to the midpoint of the 20th century. The 
highest number was observed during the Great Crash of 1929 (13.5). It was followed 
closely by the Crash of 1987 (13). A second tier is composed of the three most recent 
events – Dot-com Bubble of 2000 (11), Financial Crisis of 2007-10 (10.5), and 
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 (10). The earliest crises were more limited, with 
comparatively more limited factors – Tulipmania of 1637 (8.5), South Sea Bubble of 
1720 (8.5), and Mississippi Scheme of 1720 (9).  
This is confirmed by the information in Chart 5. Although the recent crisis 
involving the U.S. has certainly been serious, it ranks at the bottom of the list in 
terms of severity. The Financial Crisis of 2007-10 was the mildest at 31.60%, 
followed by Dot-com Bubble of 2000 at 35.24% and Crash of 1987 at 36.13%. The 
Great Crash of 1929, in comparison, was over twice as large at 87.17%. Tulipmania, 
however, was more dramatic than the 1929 crash at 91.67%, as were the Mississippi 
Scheme of 1720 and the South Sea Bubble of 1720, both of which witnessed 100% 
declines. The black hole, however, was the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 
witnessing currency increases of more than 100%. The rupiah, for instance, 
appreciated by over 475%. Granted the rupiah had been appreciating for many years, 
but the appreciation accelerated in 1997 and 1998. Looking at averages in the last 
column, we see that increasing markets take an average of 737 days, while 
recoveries only take an average of 480 days or 65% of the duration of increases. 
The common elements can then be brought together in three categories – 
characteristics of individuals, market, and crash: 
 
 
Underlying individual characteristics: 
Bubble (100%) 
Human emotion and greed (93.75%) 
Speculation (93.75%) 
 
Underlying market characteristics: 
Poor economic fundamentals (56.25%) 
Uneducated investors (81.25%) 
New product offering (93.75%) 
 
Crash: 
Panic selling (87.5%) 
Stock market crash (93.75%) 
Economic crash (100%) 
 
The lesson for all of us as individuals and investors is to be wary of individual and 




Chart 5: Comparison of Stock Market Crashes 














Market Tulips Shares Shares Dow Jones Dow Jones Rupiah Dow Jones Dow Jones
 
Origin Price 500 500 130 152.73 1767.58 2,361/$1 4157.69 7591.93  
Date 1634 5/5/1716 2/2/1720 1/25/1927 7/1/1986 1/1/1997 1/3/1995 7/1/2002  
High Price 6,000 18,000 1,000 381.17 2722.4 2,432/$1 11722.98 13,895.63  
Date 1636 1/1/1720 6/22/1720 9/3/1929 8/25/1987 5/1/1997 1/14/2000 7/2/2007  
Duration Days 730 1,335 140 951 420 120 379 1827 737 
Low Price 500 0 33 42.84 1738.74 14,000/$1 7591.93 7,608.92  
Date 1637 11/1/1720 12/31/1720 4/1/1932 10/19/87 6/17/1998 7/1/2002 1/2/2009  
Drop Price 5,500 18,000 967 338.33 983.66 11,400 4131.05 6286.71  
Drop % 91.67 100 96.7 88.77 36.13 475.65 35.24 31.60  
Duration Days 365 304 192 1,067 54 413 897 549 480 
 
 
